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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ... ON THE WAY OUT?
There is a compelling need to review the Supreme Court's
position regarding capital punishment, in light of a growing
national trend in the courts, as well as the state legislatures,
away from the death penalty as an acceptable mode of
punishment for the convicted felon. Five crucial issues are
recognizable: First, has the Supreme Court by prolonged
implication of silence recognized that capital punishment is not
violative of tbe eightb amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment? Second, why has the Supreme Court
remained silent during this period while a growing number of
cases have been appealed in those states where capital punish-
ment is the established law? Third, what of the hundreds of
condemned felons who hope for Supreme Court review of the
issue of wbetber the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment? Fourth, what will be the implications of the
congressional review which is currently taking place? Fifth, can
the legislatures of the various states formulate law utilizing the
punis hment of death, in possible direct contravention to the
rights of the individual as guaranteed by the Constitution?
I. THE SUBJECTIVE REACTION TO THE DEATH PENALTY.
Is judicial death either essential or for the public good? Lewis E.
Lawes, while Warden of Sing-Sing prison in New York in the Twenties
and early Thirties, developed specific opposition to the death penalty.
He witnessed the deaths of over 150 men and one woman and stated:
My opposition to capital punishment is not based on sentiment
or sympathy. . . I am opposed to the death penalty because the
evasions, the inequality of its application, the halo with which it
surrounds every convicted murderer, the theatrics which are so
important to every court proceeding where the stake is life or
death, the momentary hysteria, passion and prejudice aroused
by the crime which often make it impossible to weigh the facts
carefully and impersonally and, finally, the infrequency of its
application-all tend to weaken our entire structure of social
control. They make for cynicism and disrespect of all law
enforcing agencies, and encourage the desperate criminal toward
the extreme crime. He knows that his gamble with the death
penalty is safer than with a long term in prison for a lesser
offence.1
1 L. LAWES, TWENTY THOUSAND YEARS IN SING-SING 307-308 (1932) [hereinafter
cited as LAWES]. -!
As early as 1924, Clarence Darrow, the eminent defense attorney,
immediately following his defense of Leopold and Loeb in the Bobby
Franks murder trial, was challenged to a debate by Judge Alfred J.
Talley of the Court of General Sessions, New York City. The following
are Darrow's personal views as espoused in their debate:
We teach people to kill and the State is the one that teaches
them. If the State wishes that its citizens respect human life,
then the State should stop killing. It can be done in no other
way, and it will perhaps not be fully done that way. There are
infinite reasons for killing. There are infinite circumstances
under which there are more or less deaths. It never did depend
and never can depend upon the severity of the punishment ....
Now, why am I opposed to capital punishment? It is too
horrible a thing for a State to undertake ....
The people of the State kill a man because he killed
someone else-that is all-without the slightest logic, without
the slightest application to life, simply from anger, nothing else!
I am against it... because I believe that as the hearts of men
have softened they, have gradually gotten rid of brutal punish-
ment, because I believe that it will only be a few years until it
will be banished forever from every civilized country-even New
York; because I believe that it has no effect whatever to stop
murder.2
Kansas abolished the death penalty in 19073 and restored it in
193 5.4 During this period Governor Harry H. Woodring made a valiant
plea not to restore the death penalty, vetoing a bill only for it to be
later carried by the legislature:
The possibility of the infliction of the death penalty in any case
dramatizes it before the public. What should be a solemn
deliberation becomes a public spectacle, with the resultant
brutalizing effect upon society. It is not desirable to have our
communities divided, with one faction demanding the life of
2 A. WEINBERG, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 92,96-97 (1957). Judge Talley's
vindictive retort, although accepted in substance by some would not be the general view of
today:
The penalty of death is the one thing the criminal fears ...
ITIhat where [a person's] life in imminent danger "neither God nor man would
question [his] right to defend [his] life." If the individual has that right to kill in
self-defense ... why has not the State, "which is nothing more than an aggregation of
individuals, the same right to defend itself against unjust aggression and unjust attack?"...
Those who want to take away from the State the power to impose the death sentence
seek to "despoil the symbol of justice."
The object of punishment of crime must be deterrent, and it must be vindictive - not
vindictive in the sense of revengeful, but it must be imposed so that the Law and its majesty
and sanctity may be vindicated". . .Id. at 90.
3 Act of January 30, 1907, ch. 188, (1907) Laws of Kansas 299-300 (repealed 1935).
4 Act of March 12, 1935, ch. 154, 11935] Laws of Kansas 234. For the most recent
codification of the Kansas view on capital punishment see KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, §403
(1964).
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the criminal and another faction going to the other extreme of
sympathy for the accused, thus greatly increasing the possibility
of error, and there is no remedy in case of error.
In his testimony before the Royal Commission of Capital Punish-
ment, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that he was strongly against capital
punishment for reasons that are not related to concern for the murderer
or the risk of convicting the innocent:
... When life is at hazard in a trial, it sensationalizes the whole
thing almost unwittingly; the effect on juries, the Bar, the
public, the judiciary, I regard as very bad. I think scientifically
the claim of deterrence is not worth much. Whatever proof
there may be in my judgment does not outweigh the social loss
due to the inherent sensationalism of a trial for life. 6
In his dissenting opinion in Rudolph v. Alabama,7 Mr. Justice
Goldberg offered these substantial questions for the Court to consider:
I would grant certiorari in this case and in No. 169, Misc.,
Snider v. Cunningbam, supra, to consider whether the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
permit the imposition of the death penalty on a convicted rapist
who has neither taken nor endangered human life.
The following questions, inter alia, seem relevent and
worthy of argument and consideration:
(1) In light of the trend both in this country and
throughout the world against punishing rape by death, does the
imposition of the death penalty by those States which retain it
for rape violate "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of our maturing society, ' 8 or "standards of decency
more or less universally accepted'? 9
(2) Is the taking of human life to protect a value other than
human life consistent with the constitutional proscription
against "punishments which by their excessive ... severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged"? 0
(3) Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g., deter-
rence, isolation, rehabilitation) be achieved as effectively by
punishing rape less severely than by death (e.g., by life
imprisonment); if so, does the imposition of the death penalty
for rape constitute "unnecessary cruelty"?i
5 LAWES, supra at 304 (emphasis added).
6 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 27-28 (1967).
7 375 U. S. 889, 889-891 (1963).
s Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (Opinion of Warren, C. J., joined by Justices Black,
Douglas, and Whittaker).
9 Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459,469 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
10 Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 371, quoting from the dissenting opinion of Field,
J., in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 339-340. Cf Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225,
231 dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
I IId. at 370.
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Rather than excuse the use of the death penalty by stating we do it
because everyone else does it, Judge Cooley in his work on Constitu-
tional Limitations gives the reasoning why, until public outcry, the
death penalty is acceptable in a constitutional sense:
It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by
cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment
declared by statute for an offence which was punishable in the
same way at the common law could not be regarded as cruel or
unusual in the constitutional sense. And probably any new
statutory offence may be punished to the extent and m the mode
permitted by the common law for offences of similar nature. But
those degrading punishments which in any state had become
obsolete before its existing constitution was adopted, we think
may well be held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual.12
Unfortunately, the execution of the innocent is not a myth. Edward
Bennett Williams in his book, One Man's Freedom,13 notes four cases
in which a jury of twelve sentenced innocent men to their death. On
August 12, 1925 a paymaster in Buffalo, New York was robbed and
killed by a bandit wearing dark glasses. One Edward Larkman was
arrested and charged with the crime. He wa improperly identified by
the sole eye-witness to the crime, an identification based on a total of
five seconds of observation. Shortly before Larkman's scheduled
execution Governor Alfred E. Smith commuted his sentence to life
imprisonment. In commuting the sentence Governor Smith said that
should a later disclosure prove him innocent, "The State would be
helpless if [he] were dead." 14 Two years later a Buffalo gangster,
Anthony Kolkiewiz, confessed to the crime.
In Britain, Timothy Evans, an illiterate lorry driver, was accused of
murdering his wife and child. At trial, Evans accused John Christie, the
chief witness for the Crown. But the jury believed Christie and
disbelieved Evans who was found guilty and on March 9, 1950, Evans
was hanged while still protesting his innocence. Three years later the
same Christie was arrested and accused of murdering his own wife.
Upon a thorough search six other victims (women) were found. Christie
confessed to the earlier murders for which Evans was hanged.1 s
In another English case a prostitute was murdered, and one Walter
Graham Rowland was arrested, convicted and sentenced to die. He had
a criminal record and admittedly had been intimate with the victim and
was seen in her company shortly before she was killed. He made a
moving plea of innocence when asked the usual questions as to whether
12 T. M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 472 (7th
ed. 1903).
13 EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS, ONE MAN'S FREEDOM (1962).
14 Id. at 237.
15 Id. at 238.
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he had anything to say about why sentence of death should not be
imposed according to law. He answered:
Yes, I have, my Lord. I have never been a religious man, but as I
have sat in this court during these last few hours the teachings
of my boyhood have come back to me, and I say in all sincerity
and before you and this court that when I stand in the Court of
Courts before the Judge of Judges I shall be acquitted of this
crime. Somewhere there is a person who knows that I stand
here today an innocent man. The killing of this woman was a
terrible crime, but there is a worse crime being committed now,
my Lord, because someone with the knowledge of this crime is
seeing me sentenced today for a crime which I did not commit.
I have a firm belief that one day it will be proved in God's own
time that I am totally innocent of this charge, and the day will
come when this case will be quoted in the courts of this country
to show what can happen to a man in a case of mistaken
identity. I am going to face what lies before me with the
fortitude and calm that only a clear conscience can give. That is
all I have got to say, my Lord. 16
After exhausting his appellate rights Rowland, like Evans, was
hanged while still protesting his innocence. Four years later the real
killer walked into a police station and confessed to the crime.' 7 Capital
punishment is indefensible if only because it renders irreversible these
miscarriages of justice.
I. THE VALIDITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A DETERRENT
One of the primary rationales for retaining capital punishment is that
it serves as an effective deterrent against the perpetration of heinous
offences. At present, it is impossible to substantiate or disprove the
validity of this viewpoint. A most extensive study on the question,
made by Professor Thorsten Sellin, raises doubts as to the unique
deterrent effect of capital punishment. Professor Sellin analyzed the
1930-37 murder rates of several groups of neighboring and otherwise
similar states; within each group one or more states had abolished the
death penalty. Professor Sellin found that the trends in homicide were
substantially similar for comparable capital and non-capital punishment
states. Within each group of states having similar social and economic
conditions, it was impossible to distinguish the abolition state from the
others.' 8 He examined the data from states which had experimented
with the abolition of the death penalty and then reinstated it; this data
did not reveal any significant increase in homicide rates when it was
16 Id. at 239.
17 Id.
18 See Sellin, The Death Penalty, in MODEL PENAL CODE (tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
abolished, nor any significant decrease in the rates when it was restored.
He also made a survey of the number of metropolitan policemen killed
in the line of duty in the states which had abolished capital punishment
and in states which had retained it. His data shows that there was no
significant difference between the two types of states in so far as the
safety of policemen was concerned.
Professor Glen W. Samuelson has reviewed the results of the
re-establishment of capital punishment in Delaware.' 9 Quoting
Professor Samuelson:
The annual average number of murder commitments for the
ten year period between July 1, 1956 to June 30, 1966 was
17.1. If abolition encouraged more murders, a higher than 17.1
annual rate of murder commitments should occur during the
abolition period than before or after.
During the 21 months before abolition, 40 murder commit-
ments occurred or a rate of 22.8 per year, 5.7 above the 10 year
annual rate of 17.1. The annual rate prior to abolition was 9.0
higher than the rate during abolition (22.8-13.8=9.0).
The 44.5 months during abolition involved 51 participants
or an annual rate of 13.8 murder commitments of 3.3 below the
10 year average.
During the 54.5 months after the restoration of the death
penalty, 80 murder commitments occurred or a rate of 17.5 per
year, 4 per year higher than the 1 year average and 3.7 higher
than the annual rate during abolition (17.5-13.8=2.7).
From the results of this study, the restoration of capital
punishment for first degree murder apparently did not act as a
deterrent. The return of the death penalty was primarily a
reaction to four well publicized brutal murders in Southern
Delaware.20
III. STATE COURTS INTERPRETATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
IN LIGHT OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
State legislative debate has centered around the established right to
determine punishment and sentence for those crimes committed in the
jurisdiction of each particular state. Seemingly, there has been no
original court treatment holding capital punishment as cruel and
unusual punishment.2 1 Rather legislative action in those states where
capital punishment is abolished has been taken without the specific
direction of the state courts.
19 See Why Was Capital Punishment Restored in Delaware? (60 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 148
(1969).2 0 Id. at 149-150 (emphasis added).
21 U. S. CONST. amend. VIII, "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
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It is interesting to note the purpose of the infliction of death as
noted in State v. Tomassi22 at the beginning of the twentieth century:
But finally it is argued that the so-called Electrocution Act
is in contravention of our Constitution (article 1, § 15), which
declares that "cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted."
It is not easy to define what punishments are "cruel and
unusual" within the the constitutional inhibition. In a limited
sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or
distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the
convict, it may be said that all punishments are in some sense
cruel. But, of course, the constitution does not mean that crime
for this reason is to go unpunished. On the contrary, it plainly
contemplates that crime can only be effectively deterred by
inflicting some sort of pain or suffering upon the convicted
offender.
By the common law, murder, and indeed many crimes much
less serious, were punished by death. This is still the punishment
under our law for the crime of murder in the first degree. It is
absurd to suppose that the Constitution prohibits it. Therefore,
it is open to the legislature to determine some mode in which
the death penalty may be inflicted. Instead of hanging by the
neck, they have now provided that death shall be caused as
speedily as possible by the direct application of electricity to
the body of the convict. On its face the statute imports an
effort by the lawmaking body to mitigate the pain and suffering
of the convict. We cannot assume that death by electric current
is a cruel punishment in the constitutional sense.2 3
In Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Crampton:
2 4
It is not argued that the penalty of death by electrocution is
any more cruel or unusual than death by the historical methods
of hanging or shooting. Thus, defendant's contention must
amount to one that the punishment of death for the crime of
first degree murder violates the constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments.
The crime of first degree murder is the most serious crime in
this state and, in the instant case, required a finding by the
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of an intentional killing 
with
deliberate and premeditated malice. If any crime will support
the death penalty, this crime will.25
In People v. Doyle Alva Terry,2 6 the defendant contended that being
22 75 N. J. L. 739, 69 A. 214 (1908).
23 75 N. J. L. 746-747,69 A. 217-218.
24 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N. E. 2d 614 (1969).
25 18 Ohio St. 2d 187, 248 N. E. 2d 618.
26 70 Cal. Sup. 2d 410, 77 Cal. Rptr. 460, 454 P. 2d 36 (1969). In Purvis the petitioner
sought to prevent the holding of a fourth penalty trial after he had three times obtained reversal
of the death penalty because of misconduct of the prosecution.
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subject to a fifth trial in which the punishment would be death (the
three previous trials having been reversed and the fourth declared a
mistrial) would constitute cruel and unusual punishment and be in
violation of the eighth amendment. The Supreme Court of California in
its decision cited a previous California case, Purvis v. State of
California.2 7 The court in Purvis stated:
As a general proposition having to sit through a trial may be
an onerous burden for a defendant, but it is not a cruel and
certainly not an unusual punishment ....
Certainly the California authorities should now be on notice
that there is a constitutional limit to the number of times a man
must undergo a trial where his life is at stake, and where one of
the reasons for the repeated trials is deliberate misconduct by
the prosecutor.28
The court, in Terry, didn't regard the fourth penalty trial as
exceeding that limit.
In the instant case, where deliberate misconduct has not been a
factor in the reversal of penalty trials, a fifth penalty trial will
not constitute such punishment. 2 9
In People v. Vaughn,3 0 the defendant contended that to subject him
to the death penalty for an assault which did not result in the death of
the victim is to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon him. The
court held:
We have long upheld section 4500 [California death penalty]
against this and related challenges to the penalty which it
imposes. These decisions do not necessarily settle the question
for all time, however, since in applying the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment we must reflect
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.'
In a Texas decision, Ellison v. State of Texas,3 2 Judge Woodley
made references to Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in Rudolph v.
Alabama, supra, yet still affirmed a lower court's decision that the
crime of robbery combined with rape could be punished by the death
penalty. The Texas decision shows the trend in the state courts against
the establishment of new guidelines, the courts being content to remain
in the past. The defendant was found guilty of the crime of robbery
27 234 F. Supp. 147 (N. D. Cal. 1964).
2 8 Id. at 151.
29 77 Cal. Rptr. at 465,454 P. 2d at 41-42.
30 78 Cal. Rptr. 186,455 P. 2d 122 (1969).
31 78 Cal. Rptr. at 192,455 P. 2d at 129.
32 Ellison v. State, 419 S. W. 2d 849 (Tes. Crim. App. 1967).
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with a deadly weapon. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
evidence that the defendant had kidnapped and raped a sales clerk after
robbing a liquor store was admissible at the defendant's trial, even
though he was being tried for robbery with a deadly weapon, and the
death penalty was not excessive or cruel and unusual punishment for
the conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon. The court stated that:
We are aware of no authority for a holding that death is
excessive punishment for robbery with a deadly weapon. The
nearest appellant approaches the question is the dissenting
opinion in Rudolpb v. Alabama ... which expressed the view
that certiorari should be granted "to consider whether the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution permit the imposition of the death penalty on a
convicted rapist who has neither taken nor endangered human
life." 3 3
On December 11, 1970 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
as a court of three judges, rendered its decision in Ralph v. Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary.3 a The court held that in a conviction for rape
where the victim's life was neither taken or endangered, the punishment
of death was prohibited under the eighth amendment, as being a cruel
and unusual punishment for the crime involved.
Armed with a tire iron, Ralph broke into the victim's home late
at night. Threatening her and her young son, who was asleep in
another room, with death if she did not submit, he forcibly
committed rape and sodomy .... The physician who thorough-
ly examined her shortly after the crime testified that he found
"no outward evidence of injury or violence" nor any signs of
unusual psychological trauma.35
Five days later Ralph was arrested in the District of Columbia on other
charges and while incarcerated, he confessed to the Maryland crime.
The court would not accept the state's argument, other than lack of
precedent, favoring Ralph:
[T] hat abolition of capital punishment presents a political
question which only the legislative branch of government can
resolve. 3 6
33 Id. at 851.
34 438 F. 2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3058(U.S. June 1,
1971) (No. 228).
35 Id. at 788. Part of the Court's rationale was espoused in this quote from Snider v. Peyton,
356 F. 2d 626, 627 (4th Cir. 1966):
There is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists. If one were sentenced to
death upon conviction of rape of an adult under circumstances lacking great aggravation, the
Supreme Court might well find it an appropriate case to consider the constitutional questions
tendered to us. Even inferior courts such as ours might find the question not foreclosed to it
if the actual and potential harm to the victiri was relatively slight.
36 Id.
Capital Punisbment
The court also noted:
The fact that a Maryland statute 3 7 authorizes capital punish-
ment for rape does not conclusively establish the punishment's
constitutionality, for the Eighth Amendment is a limitation on
both legislative and judicial action.3 8
The court commented on the extreme infrequency of execution for
rape:
Infrequent imposition of the death penalty for rape not
only indicates that it is excessive, it also suggests that it is meted
out arbitrarily. In 1960, the year Ralph committed the offence,
15,560 reports of rape were recorded in the United States...
In contrast to the frequency of the commission of rape, the
imposition of the death penalty is extremely rare. In 1961, the
year in which Ralph was convicted, 21 persons were sentenced
to death for rape, and in the period 1960-1968, 101 convicted
rapists received death sentences. During the same period of time
28 prisoners were actually executed for the crime. The high
incidence of the crime compared with the low incidence of the
death penalty suggests the lack of a rational ground for selecting
the prisoners on whom the death penalty is inflicted. This is
particularly true when, as here, the harshest penalty is imposed
on a rapist whose act is not marked with the great aggravation
that often accompanies this crime.3 9
The court held:
We conclude, therefore, that two factors coalesce to
establish that the death sentence is so disproportionate to the
crime of rape when the victim's life is neither taken nor
endangered that it violates the Eighth Amendment. First, in
most jurisdictions death is now considered an excessive penalty
for rape. This has been demonstrated by the legislative trend to
abolish capital punishment for this crime and by the infre-
quency of its infliction in jurisdictions that still authorize it.
Second, when a rapist does not take or endanger the life of his
victim, the selection of the death penalty from the range of
punishment authorized by statute is anomalous when compared
to the large number of rapists who are sentenced to prison. Lest
our opinion be given a breadth greater than is necessary for the
decision of this case, we do not hold, despite the argument of
the Amicus Curiae, that death is an unconstitutional punish-
ment for all rapes.64
37 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §461 (Repl. Vol. 1967) provides:
Every person convicted of a crime of rape or as being accessory thereto before the fact
shall, at the discretion of the court, suffer death, or be sentenced to confinement in the
penitentiary for the period of his natural like, or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary
for not less than eighteen months nor more than twenty-one years; and penetration shall be
evidence of rape, without proof of emission.
30 438 F. 2d at 788-789.
39 Id at 793.
40 Id.
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The court noted that (1) the Commission on National Reform of
Federal Criminal law has recommended the abolishment of the death
penalty for the crime of rape; that (2) in the District of Columbia
Congress eliminated death as a penalty for rape a l and that (3) the
Model Penal Code in its proposed official draft of 1962 has recom-
mended repeal of the death penalty for rape.4 2
IV. MARYLAND'S STAND ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.
Inflicting the death sentence by hanging was held not cruel or
unusual punishment in Maryland in 1914. In Dutton v. State,4 3
appellant was convicted of an assault with intent to rape and was
sentenced to be hanged by virtue of a statute in effect at that time. It
was argued that the penalty was contrary to the Constitution,
forbidding cruel and unusual punishments. The court said:
Article 16 of the Declaration of Rights of our present
Constitution declares that "No law to inflict cruel and unusual
pains and penalties ought to be made in any case or at any time
ereafter,' and Article 25 is, "That excessive bail ought not to
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted by the Courts of Law." It would hardly be
contended that the punishment provided by our statute for the
crime of rape-death or confinement in the penitentiary for not
less than eighteen months, or more than twenty-one years-is in
conflict with those provisions, and when the Legislature
changed the penalty or an attempt to commit the crime to
death or confinement in the penitentiary, in the discretion of
the Court, it is probable that it took into consideration the fact
that it is often difficult to prove whether the crime of rape was
actually consummated. Under some circumstances, the outrage
upon the particular woman and upon society can scarcely be
said to be less because the prisoner did not succeed in
accomplishing his purpose than if he had. If a revolting crime of
this nature is so frequently repeated as, in the judgment of the
Legislature, to call for such punishment, we cannot declare it to
be contrary to such provisions of the Constitution.44
Maryland has gone through a change in application of its death
penalty. As late as 1951 the sentence of death was by hanging.
If an offender, on conviction, may be sentenced to suffer
death, the Court before whom such offender shall be tried and
convicted, shall sentence him to suffer death by hanging by the
41 D. C. Ct. Ref. & Pro. Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, §20, 84 Stat. 473,600,amending
D. C. CODE ANN. §22-2801 (1970).
42 ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE, § §213.1 and 6-06 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
43 123 Md. 373,91 A. 417 (1914).
44 123 Md. at 385, 91 A. at 422.
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neck; and when a case has been removed for Trial and the party
shall be sentenced to be hung, the Court shall remand him to
the place where the indictment was found, where such offender
shall remain in the custody of the Sheriff of that County or
City for disposition as hereinafter provided.4
With the passage of time, Maryland has what would appear to be a
more humane method of execution:
If an offender, on conviction, may be sentenced to suffer
death, the Court before whom such offender shall be tried and
convicted, shall sentence him to suffer death by the administra-
tion of a lethal gas; and when a case has been remanded for trial
and the party shall be sentenced to death, the Court shall
remand him to the place where the indictment was found,
where such offender shall remain in the custody of the Sheriff
of that County or City for disposition as hereinafter pro-
vided.46
Yet an attempt to administer a more humane death still does not
answer the query whether the death penalty by itself is cruel and
unusual punishment. The following crimes in which murder is commit-
ted as a by-product all fall under the death penalty: conviction of
murder in the first degree, 4 7 murder committed in perpetration of
arson,48 murder committed in burning barn, tobacco-house, etc.,4 9
and murder committed in perpetration of rape, sodomy, mayhem,
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, storehouse breaking, daytime house-
breaking or escape. 10
In the context of defining the latitude of the trial court's and jury's
discretion in prescribing the death penalty, the Maryland Code states:
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, his or her
aiders, abettors and counsellors shall suffer death or undergo a
confinement in the penitentiary of the State for the period of
their natural life, in the discretion of the Court before whom
45 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,§503 (1951). Considered as humane, hanging by the neck until
dead also involved witnessing the State's act:
The Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary is hereby authorized and directed to provide
and maintain a permanent death chamber within the confines of said Penitentiary, and
which said death chamber shall have all the necessary appliances for the proper execution of
felons by hanging by the neck until dead. In said chamber shall be executed all felons upon
whom the death penalty hIs been imposed, for offences committed on or after January 1 st,
1923. Each execution shall be conducted by the said Warden or some assistant or assistants
designated by him, in the presence of the Sheriff of the County or City where such felon
was indicted, the physician of the said Penitentiary, or his assistant, and a number of
respectable citizens numbering not less than six or more than twelve. Counsel for the
convict and two ministers of the gospel may be present. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§504(1951).
46 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §71 (1957).
47 MD. ANN. CODE art 27, §407 (1957).
49 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,§408(1957).
49 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §409 (1957).
S0 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §410 (1957).
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such person may be tried; provided, however, that the jury in a
murder case who render a verdict of murder in the first degree,
may add thereto the words "without capital punishment," in
which case the sentence of the Court shall be imprisonment for
life, and in no case where a jury shall have rendered a verdict in
manner and form as herein prescribed "without capital punish-
ment" shall the Court in imposing the sentence, sentence the
convicted party to pay the death penalty.5 1
In Abbot v. State,s 2 the accused had pleaded guilty to an indictment
for murder and had been sentenced to be hanged. The Maryland Court
of Appeals held that the extent of punishment rested solely with the
trial court, and it was not to be the subject of appellate review.
Rape constitutes, by itself without loss of life, a crime by which the
perpetrator or his accessory may also suffer the death penalty:
But no particular amount of force, either actual or constructive,
is required to constitute rape. Necessarily that fact must depend
upon the prevailing circumstances .... [F] orce may consist of
threats without violence. If the acts and threats of the
defendant were reasonably calculated to create in the mind of
the victim-having regard to the circumstances in which she was
placed-a real apprehension, due to fear, of imminent bodily
harm, serious cjtough to impair or overcome her will to resist,
then such acts .nd threats a -e the equivalent of force.5 3
In McEntire v. State,s4 it was noted that penetration must be proved
before there can be a conviction of rape; and yet penetration could be
shown by testimony from the prosecuting witness that the defendant
had "sexual intercourse" with her.
Some would say we have come a long way toward a humane
approach to the death penalty wherein at the turn of the century:
If any person or persons shall willfully and maliciously make an
assault upon any railroad train, railroad cars or railroad
locomotive within this Territory for the purpose and with the
intent to commit murder, robbery or any other felony, upon or
against any passenger on said train or cars, or upon or against
any engineer, conductor or fireman, brakeman or any officer or
employee connected with said locomotive, train or cars, or
upon or against any express messenger, or mail agent on said
tram, or in any of the cars thereof, on conviction thereof, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall suffer the punishment of
death.5 s
51 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §413 (1957).
52 188 Md. 310, 52 A. 2d 489 (1947).
53 Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 469, 157 A. 2d 922, 925 (1960).
54 2 Md. App. 449, 235 A. 2d 311, 313 (1967).
55 Territory v. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, 278-279, 61 P. 208,212 (1900).
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Yet review of the statutes presently in force in Maryland in 1971 would
indicate quite to the contrary; we have remained static as regards
capital punishment.
V. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT.
The guideline the court has followed was first reported in In re
Kemmler, in 1890.56 There the court held:
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.5 "
In Ex parte Wilson,"8 Mr. Justice Gray in his majority opinion
granting a plea for habeas corpus stated:
What punishments shall be considered as infamous may be
affected by the changes of public opinion from one age to
another. In former times, being put in the stocks was not
considered as necessarily infamous .... But at the present day
either stocks or whipping might be thought an infamous
punishment.5 9
In 1910, the Court held in Weems v. United States6 0 a sentence of
fifteen years unconstitutional when the punishment was at hard labor
in ankle chains, and life time civil disabilities were imposed for the
falsification of a public record in the Philippines Territory, this penalty,
cadena temporal, being held unconstitutionally disproportionate for so
minor a crime.
The Supreme Court in 1947 was faced with a unique decision, in
Francis v. Resweber6 1 in which it, following the earlier In re Kemmler
decision, upheld the death penalty as not violative of the eighth
amendment. The issue and the fact situation are so unique that it is
given here in detail.
Upon writ of certiorari, the Court reviewed a unique situation. Willie
Francis, a black citizen of Louisiana was duly convicted of murder and
in September 1945 was sentenced to be electrocuted for the crime.
Pursuant to a warrant he was prepared for electrocution on May 3,
1946 and was placed in the official electric chair of the State of
56 136 U. S. 436, 447 (1890).
57 Id at 447. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1878), where it was held death sentences
by shooting do not violate the eighth amendment.
5 8114 l. S. 417 (1885).
9 Id at 427-428.
60 217 U. S. 349 (1910).s,
61 329 U. S. 459 (1947).
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Louisiana in the presence of authorized witnesses. The executioner
threw the switch but, presumably because of some mechanical
difficulty, death did not result. He was thereupon removed from the
chair and returned to prison. A new death warrant was issued by the
Governor of Louisiana. By applications for certiorari petitioner claimed
the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
on the ground that the execution under the circumstances would deny
due process to him because of the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment provision of
the eighth amendment.
The Court stated:
We find nothing in what took place here which amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment in he constitutional sense. The
case before us does not call for an examination into any
punishments except that of death ... The traditional humanity
of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of
unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence.
Prohibition against wanton infliction of pain has come into our
law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The identical words appear
in our Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth would prohibit by
its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner.
Petitioner's suggestion is that because he once went under the
psychological strain of preparation for electrocution, now to
require him to undergo this preparation again subjects him to a
lingering or cruel and unusual punishment. Even the fact that
petitioner has already been subjected to a current of electricity
does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the
constitutional sense than any other execution. The cruelty
against wbicb the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the metbod of punishment, not the
necessar y suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguisb life bumanely. The fact that an unforseeable accident
prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it
seems to us, add an element of cruelty to a subsequent
execution. There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain
involved in the proposed execution. The situation of the
unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had
suffered the identical amount of mental anguish and physical
pain in any other occurence, such as, for example, a fire in the
cell block. We cannot agee that the hardship imposed upon the
petitioner rises to that level of hardship denounced as denial of
due process because of cruelty. 6 2
Mr. Justice Burton with Mr. Justice Douglas concurring offered a
prophetic dissent, and conceivably Mr. Justice Douglas' view may well
be the view he would hold today; seemingly this view is one to which
6 2 ld at 473-464(emphasis added).
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most lay people and jurists today adhere:
The capital case before us presents an instance of the
violation of constitutional due process that is more clear than
would be presented by many lesser punishments prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment or its state counterparts. Taking human
life by unnecessarily cruel means shocks the most fundamental
instincts of civilized man. It should not be possible under the
constitutional procedure of a self-governing people. Abhorrence
of the cruelty of ancient forms of capital punishment has
increased steadily until, today, some states have prohibited
capital punishment altogether. It is unthinkable that any state
legislature in modern times would enact a statute expressly
authorizing capital punishment by repeated applications of an
electric current separated by intervals of days, or hours until
finally death shall result.6
In 1958 the Court determined that a punishment for a crime could
be cruel and unusual without regard to the seriousness of the crime. In
Trop v. Dulles,6 4 the court held that the punishment of expatriation
violates the eigth amendment. It moved beyond concern with
extreme, lingering physical pain to the mere possibility of much pain
and then to similar distress; beyond that, it emphasized the sheer
enormity of the punishment. The Court's decision although not holding
that the death penalty is unconstitutional may offer some indicia of a
development in thinking towards this end:
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and
unusual" has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic
policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the
Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice. The phrase in our
Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of
Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced
back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.
While the state has the power to punish, the Amendment stands
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may
be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is
constitutionally suspect .... The Amendment must draw its
meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.6 s
The Supreme Court found a procedure in 1968 for declaring the
death penalty unconstitutional, though not challenging the legality of
capital punishment per se. The Court held that a death sentence could
6 Id at 473-474.
64 356 U. S. 86 (1958).
65 Id. at 99-101.
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not be carried out if the jury that imposed it was chosen by excluding
veniremen for cause, simply because they voiced general objections to
the death penalty or expressed religious or conscientious scruples
against its infliction. The Court held that the only persons who may be
constitutionally excluded are those who state they would never impose
the death penalty; if the voir dire testimony in any given case indicates
that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death
sentence will be deemed invalid.6 6
With the governors of those states having condemned men awaiting
execution requiring some direction from the Court as to the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty,6 7 the Court rendered on May 3, 1971, a
combined decision, McGautba v. California and Crampton v. Ohio6 8
not on the constitutionality of capital punishment, but on the
secondary issue as to the rights of the accused and condemned as to due
process of law.
In McGautba the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in
California and was sentenced to death. The penalty was left to the
jury's absolute discretion, and punishment was determined in a separate
proceeding following the trial on the issue of guilt. In Crampton the
petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to
death in Ohio, where the jury which also had absolute penalty
discretion, determined guilt and penalty after a single trial and in a
single verdict. The McGautba case was limited to the question:
Whether petitioner's constitutional rights were infringed by
permitting the jury to impose the death penalty without any
governing standards. 6 9
While in the Crampton case the issues were limited to the McGautba
issue and to the further question of whether the jury's imposition of
the death sentence in the same proceeding as determined the issue of
guilt was constitutionally permissible.
The Court held that the claimed absence of standards to guide the
jury's discretion on the punishment issue, leaving the jury completely at
large to impose or withhold the death penalty as it sees fit, does not
violate the basis due process command of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court stated:
In light of history, experience and the present limitations of
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that com-
66 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968).
6 7 E.g. The reaction to the McGautha-Crampton decision in Maryland was as follows:
Governor Mandel said today that he would not permit any executions to take place in
Maryland's gas chamber before the United States Supreme Court has decided whether the
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment under the Constitution. The Sun (Baltimore),
May 18, 1971, at C 13, col. 1.
68 McGautha v. California, Crampton v. Ohio,\91 S. Ct. 1454 (1971).
69 Id. at 1456.
mitting to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to
pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything
in the Constitution.7 0
The Court noted:
The Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws (1971) recommended entire abolition of
the death penalty in federal cases.'
The Court's consideration of the proposed reforms brings criticism on
the bodies that created them:
It is apparent that such criteria do not purport to provide more
than the most minimal control over the sentencing authority's
exercise of discretion. They do not purport to give an
exhaustive list of the relevant considerations or the way in
which they may be affected by the presence or absence of other
circumstances. They do not even undertake to exclude constitu-
tionally impermissible consideration. And, of course, they
provide no protection against the jury determined to decide on
whimsy or caprice. In short, they do no more than suggest some
subjects for the jury to consider during its deliberations, and
they bear witness to the intractable nature of the problem of
"standards" which the history of capital punishment has from
the beginning reflected.' 2
If the Court makes light of the Commission's efforts toward reform,
the Court apparently wishes that some other august body make the
final determination as to the constitutionality of capital punishment. In
concluding the majority opinion the Court stated:
It may well be, as the American Law Institute and the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws have con-
cluded, that bifurcated trials and criteria for jury sentencing
discretion are superior means of dealing with capital cases if the
death penalty is to be retained al all. 7
3
Mr. Justic Black's concurring opinion considers the overriding issue
of the constitutionality of capital punishment and provides the only
insight as to the decision of a single Justice when faced with the
ultimate issue of whether the death penalty is unconstitutional as a
cruel and unusual punishment:
I concur in the Court's judgments and in substantially all of its
opinions. However, in my view, this Court's task is not to
determine whether the petitioners' trials were "fairly con-
ducted." The Constitution grants this Court no power to reverse
convictions because of our personal beliefs that state criminal
7 0 Id. at 1467.
71 Id.
72Id
73 Id. at 1474.
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procedures are "unfair," "arbitrary," "capricious," "unreason-
able," or "shocking to our conscience." See, e.q., Rocbin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (Black, J. concurring);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 243 (1967) (Black, J.
dissenting and concurring). Our responsibility is rather to
determine whether petitioners have been denied rights expressly
or impliedly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution as written.
I agree with the Court s conclusions that the procedures
employed by California and Ohio to determine whether capital
punishment shall be imposed do not offend the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, I do not
believe that petitioners have been deprived of any other right
explicitly or impliedly guaranteed by the other provisions of the
Bill of Rights. The Eighth Amendment forbids "cruel and
unusual punishments." In my view, these words cannot be read
to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in
common use and authorized by law here and in the countries
from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was
adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the Framers intended to
end capital punishment by the amendment. Although some
people have urged that this court should amend the Constitu-
tion by interpretation to keep it abreast of modern ideas, I have
never believed that life time judges in our system have any such
legislative power. See, Harper v. Virginia Board of Education,
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting).
The true nature of what the Court had been called upon to decide
was admirably stated by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion:
It is of critical importance in the present cases to emphasize
that we are not called upon to determine the adequacy of
inadequacy of any particular legislative procedure designed to
give rationality to the capital sentencing process. For the plain
fact is that the legislatures of California and Ohio, have sought
no solution at all. We are not presented with a State's attempt
to provide standards, attache as impermissible or inadequate.
We are not presented with a legislative attempt to draw wisdom
from experience through a process looking towards growth in
understanding through the accumulation of a variety of
experiences. We are not presented with the slightest attempt to
bring the power of reason to bear on the considerations relevant
to capital sentencing. We are faced with nothing more than
stark legislative abdication.7
74 Id. at 1476-1477.
75 Id. at 1489. It is interesting to observe further executive reactions to this decision:
An aide to Governor Reagan said the Governor "agrees with the decision" handed down
today because "he believes that capital punishment is a deterrent."
In Ohio, Gov. John Gilligan reiterated his previous stand that he would permit no
executions until the Supreme Court had ruled on the fundamental issue of the
constitutionality of the death penalty. The Sun (Baltimore), May 4, 1971, at A 6, col. 1.
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VI. REVIEW OF PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
Under the direction of President Lyndon B. Johnson and by
authority of the Senate and House of Representatives 7 6 a National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws was formed.
The Commission was directed by Congress to "improve" and
"reform" not merely to recodify existing law. Among the duties
placed upon the Commission by statute was an explicit
obligation to propose "changes in the penalty structure (to)
better serve the ends of justice."'7 7
Final draft form was submitted to the President and to Congress
January 11, 1971, as well as approximately 5000 copies of the study
draft and working papers were circulated by the Commission to federal
agencies and throughout the legal profession. Commentary is now being
solicited and compiled as reference material by the National Archives in
Washington, D. C. Congress is presently reviewing the final draft form
and likely debate on the floor of Congress will occur later in 1971. The
Commission has recommeded the abolition of the death penalty. 7 8
The arguments of the Commission against the death penalty include
the following:
Studies of the deterent effect of capital punishment do not
support the view that there is an extra margin of deterrence as
between the death sentence and life imprisonment. Abolition states
show no higher murder rate than comparable states retaining the
death penalty. The murder rate shows no significant correlation with
abolition or reinstatement of capital punishment in a particular state
or country. From a moral point of view, the infliction of capital
punishment is intolerable because errors of justice do occur and are
irremediable once the accused has been executed. The state should in
any event abjure deliberate killing so as to demonstrate the supreme
value which this nation places on the sanctity of life. Capital
punishment falls unequally on rich and poor, black and white; and,
in any event, it must operate almost by chance when only a very
small number of those who commit "capital offenses" are in fact put
76 Public Law 89-801, 89th Congress, H. R. 15766 Nov. 8, 1966.
77 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS at xiii (1971).
78 The specific Commission draft provision reads as follows:
§ 3601. Life Imprisonment Authorized for Certain Offenses.
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 3001, 3201 and 3202, the court may impose
a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence up to the maximum term authorized under
section 3201 for a Class A felony in the following cases:
(i) where the defendant has been convicted of treason;
(ii) where the defendant has been convicted of murder and the court is satisfied that the
defendant intended to cause the death of another human being.
A sentence to life imprisonment shall have a minimum term of ten years unless the court
sets a longer minimum up to 25 years. The period of parole under a life sentence, for the
purposes of section 3403 (1), shall be the balance of the parolee's life or any lesser period
fixed by the court at Sentencing. Id at 311.
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to death. The role of chance and bias in capital punishment is
underlined by the extreme difficulty of defining criteria for the
imposition of the death sentence and the involvement of lay juries
who, encountering the responsibility once in a lifetime, cannot give
consistency to any capital punishment policy. The existence of
capital punishment encourages extreme procedural safeguards against
it by extension against all major criminal sanctions, to the point
where law enforcement generally is impeded and the system of
criminal justice loses credibility.7 9
VII. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A SOLUTION?
With review of the limited number of cases in point decided by the
Supreme Court, the valued pronouncements of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
and Mr. Justice Goldberg and such involved witnesses to judicial death
as former Warden Lewis E. Lawes, the heroic stand that the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has taken in the Ralph case,80 and the
strong recommendations that the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws has taken in its revised federal criminal code, it
is apparent that society is ready to abolish capital punishment.
Abolishment of the death penalty may come from Congress as it may
be applicable under the newly proposed revised Title 18, United States
Code, but this will only be effective in the area of federal crimes on
federal enclaves, only an influence upon the states. Ultimately,
abolishment of the death penalty will have to come either from the
Supreme Court 8 I on constitutional grounds or from the legislative
bodies of the several states. The challenge to meet head-on the issue of
judicially sanctioned death has been thrown out to all Americans, and it
shall be answered according to what the best interests of society
demand.
79 Id at 310. Alternatives to the text, in retaining capital punishment, would be:
(1) to extend the list of capital offenses, perhaps to all instances where it exists under
present federal law; (2) to restrict capital punishment for murder to (a) intentional murder
of the President, Vice President, President-elect or Vice President-elect of the United States;
(b) intentional murder of a law enforcement officer, or a public servant having custody of
the defendant or another, to prevent the performance of his official duties; and (c)
intentional murder by a convict, under sentence of imprisonment for murder or under
sentence of life imprisonment or death, while in custody or immediate flight therefrom. Id.
at 312.
80 Petition for certiorari has been filed by Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland,
for review of the Ralph case by the United States Supreme Court. The question presented was:
Does the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbid
execution for rape if victim's life was neither taken nor endangered? Ralph v. Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3058 (U.S. June 1, 1971) (No. 228).
81 This issue will seemingly be decided by the Supreme Court during its next term. Motions
have been filed and leave to proceed in foria pauperis were granted to petitioners, limited to
the question:
Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in this case constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Aikens v.
California, 268 Cal. App. 2d 721., 450 P.2d 258, 74 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1969); Branch v. State,
447 S.W. 2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E. 2d628
(1969); Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E. 2d 501(1969); cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W.
3566-3567 (U.S. June 29,1971) (Nos. 5049, 5135, 5059, 5133).
